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CASE NOTES
Civil Procedure-TOWARDS CONSISTENT APPLICATION OF RULE 11
SANCTIONS-Uselman v. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d 130 (Minn. 1990).
I. INTRODUCTION
Rule 11 governs frivolous pleadings, motions, or other papers
filed in court. A violation of Rule 11 by an attorney or a party sign-
ing a filed document may result in the application of sanctions by the
court.' Minnesota attorneys, to avoid sanctionable conduct, must
understand the current application of Rule 11.
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently addressed, for the first
time, the nature and scope of Rule 11.2 In Uselman v. Uselman,3 the
court addressed the fundamental policy underlying Rule 11, the pro-
cedural requirements for imposing Rule 11 sanctions, and the ques-
tion whether, under any circumstances, a party who has survived
summary judgment with its major claims intact should be subject to
sanctions after a trial predicated on those claims.4
The Uselman court held that the trial court abused its discretion5 by
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. The American Bar Association has formulated a variety of
sanctions available to a court:
a. a reprimand to the offender;
b. mandatory continuing legal education;
c. a fine;
d. an award of reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorneys'
fees, incurred as a result of the misconduct;
e. reference of the matter to the appropriate attorney disciplinary or
grievance authority;
f. an order precluding the introduction of certain evidence;
g. an order precluding the litigation of certain issues;
h. an order precluding the litigation of certain claims or defenses;
i. dismissal of the action;
j. entry of a default judgment;
k. injunctive relief limiting a party's future access to the courts; and
1. censure, suspension or disbarment from practicing before the forum
court, subject to applicable rules or statutes.
Standards and Guidelines for Practice Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
121 F.R.D. 101, 124 (1988).
2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 was amended in 1983. It is the amended
version, or "new rule," that the supreme court addressed for the first time. Uselman
v. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d 130, 142 (Minn. 1990). See infra part II for a discussion of
the history of Rule 11.
3. 464 N.W.2d 130 (Minn. 1990).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 145. The Uselman court also held that an appellate court should review
1
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imposing sanctions without providing the sanctioned attorney with
"minimum procedural safeguards."6 In addition, the court deter-
mined that the dominant policy underlying Rule 11 is deterrence. 7
Finally, the court held that any claim surviving summary judgment
cannot later be subject to Rule 1 1 sanctions. 8
This Case Note approves of the supreme court's decision as to the
primary policy underlying Rule 11. Furthermore, it applauds the
court's clarification of the procedures required before imposing Rule
1 1 sanctions. However, this Case Note criticizes the supreme court's
rigid holding that all claims surviving summary judgment will not be
subject to Rule 11 sanctions following a trial predicated on those
surviving claims.
II. HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. Overview
In 1934, Congress passed the Rules Enabling Act, which empow-
ered the Supreme Court to adopt rules of procedure.9 In 1937, the
Supreme Court adopted Rule 11 along with the other Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.0 The rule, in its original form, contained two
all Rule 11 rulings with an abuse of discretion standard. The court reasoned that this
standard would afford the trial court the flexibility required to resolve Rule 11 issues
and most effectively accomplish Rule 1 's primary goal of deterrence. Id. This is
significant because courts have not applied a consistent standard of review to Rule 11
issues. Some appellate courts have subjected certain Rule 11 issues to de novo re-
view. See, e.g., Threaf Properties, Ltd. v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn., 875 F.2d 831, 835
(11th Cir. 1989); Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1987) ("[A]
decision whether a pleading or motion is legally sufficient involves a question of law
subject to de novo review by this court."). Recently, however, the United States
Supreme Court held that appellate courts should apply an abuse of discretion stan-
dard for "all aspects of Rule 11." Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447,
2461 (1990).
6. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d at 145. The Uselman court's "minimum procedural
safeguards" are not referred to, as such, in Rule 11. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 11. Rather,
they are discussed in the context of due process rights afforded to those facing sanc-
tions. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d at 145.
7. Id. at 142. To deter is defined as follows: "[t]o discourage or stop by fear.
To stop or prevent from acting or proceeding by danger, difficulty, or other consid-
eration which disheartens or countervails the motive for the act." BLACK'S LAw DIc-
TIONARY 450 (6th ed. 1990).
8. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d at 144.
9. Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064.
10. See 4 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 1004, at 25, 27 (1987).
Rule 11 was conceived as a guard against untruthfulness in pleading. The effect
of the Rule was to place a moral obligation on attorneys to ensure that they had
subjectively satisfied themselves that good grounds existed for the maintenance of
the claim. Georgene M. Vairo, Rule II: A CriticalAnalysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 190 (1986).
See generally D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking"
[Vol. 18
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primary elements.I I First, an attorney's signature on a pleading con-
stituted certification that the attorney had "read the pleading; that to
the best of his knowledge, information and belief there was good
ground to support it; and that it was not interposed for delay."12
Secondly, Rule 11 contained provisions for striking "sham and false"
pleadings,13 and for subjecting a violator to "appropriate discipli-
nary action."' 14
Prior to the 1983 amendment, Rule 11 was essentially ignored.15
Lawyers and judges were uncertain as to the appropriate standard of
attorney conduct, 16 especially in regard to the extent of investigation
Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1976) (noting that
enforcement of old Rule 11 involved attorney honesty).
11. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. app. at 540 (1982) (amended 1983, 1987). The
following is the relevant text from Rule 11:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that
the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information, and beliefformed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be
stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the
pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this
rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorneys 'fees.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (new version); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. app. at 540 (1976)
(old version). Highlighted text represents the 1983 amendments to Rule 11.
12. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. app. at 540 (1982).
13. Id. "Sham and false" pleadings are those that were not signed, contained
"scandalous or indecent material," or were insufficiently certified by an attorney.
Vairo, supra note 10, at 190.
14. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. app. at 540-41 (1982).
15. See Risinger, supra note 10, at 34 (noting that parties sought sanctions in only
23 reported cases between 1938 and 1976); see also Vairo, supra note 10, at 191 ("Rule
11 ... was largely ignored.").
16. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes to 1983 amendment (dis-
cussing problems which the 1983 amendment would rectify). There were numerous
other problems with old Rule 11. For example, attorneys tended not to use Rule 11
against one another. See Vairo, supra note 10, at 191. Moreover, the striking of
"sham and false pleadings" tended to confuse the issue of attorney honesty with the
merits of the claim. See, e.g., Brown v. Cameron-Brown Co., 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 1181, 1189 (E.D. Va. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 652 F.2d 375 (4th Cir.
1981) (refusing to dismiss what it believed was a meritless claim because it could not
say for certain that the pleadings were sham and false).
Another problem was that the "appropriate disciplinary action" language left it
unclear as to which sanctions were available to courts. Specifically, courts disagreed
as to whether or not Rule 11 allowed them to impose monetary sanctions. See, e.g.,
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 603 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that Rule 11
provided no authority to impose monetary sanction); Orenstein v. Compusamp, Inc.,
1992]
3
Boos: Civil Procedure—Towards Consistent Application of Rule 11 Sanctio
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
required by an attorney and the precise conduct that would trigger
sanctions.' 7  In response to these uncertainties, Rule 11 was
amended in 1983.18
Amended Rule 11 contained broader and more objective t 9 stan-
dards of sanctionable conduct.20 The amended rule established
19 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 466, 469 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("Rule 11 does not
explicitly provide for the imposition of costs or attorneys' fees.").
Other courts, however, recognized that Rule 11 provided for the award of costs
and attorney's fees. See Badillo v. Cent. Steel & Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160, 1166-67
(7th Cir. 1983)("award of fees under Rule 11 can and should be utilized under ...
the proper circumstances"); Textor v. Bd. of Regents of N. Ill. Univ., 711 F.2d 1387,
1396 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that monetary sanctions may be awarded).
17. See supra note 16.
18. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11; see generally supra note 10.
19. The Second Circuit was the first circuit court positively to embrace an objec-
tive standard. In Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City ofN. Y., 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985), on
the issue of whether the attorney's conduct warranted sanctions, the court held:
The addition [to Rule 11 ] of the words "formed after a reasonable inquiry"
demand that we revise our inquiry. No longer is it enough for an attorney to
claim that he acted in good faith, or that he personally was unaware of the
groundless nature of an argument or claim. For the language of the new
[amended] Rule 11 explicitly and unambiguously imposes an affirmative
duty on each attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the viability of a
pleading before it is signed. Simply put, subjective good faith no longer pro-
vides the safe harbor it once did.
Id. at 253 (citation omitted).
Thus, wilfulness is no longer a prerequisite to disciplinary action following the
1983 amendments. This is confirmed by the portion of amended Rule 11 stating
"that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after rea-
sonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law." FED. R.
Civ. P. 11 (emphasis added). Wilfulness is still relevant, however, when determining
the appropriate sanction to be imposed. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's
notes to 1983 amendment; see generally Vairo, supra note 10, at 193 (discussing the
advisory committee's debate on standards for imposing a range of appropriate
sanctions).
20. Amended Rule 11 changed counsel's certification responsibility. Pre-amend-
ment Rule 11 required bad faith by an attorney or party before sanctions could be
imposed. Under amended Rule 11, an attorney or party is held to a reasonable attor-
ney standard. Threaf Properties v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn., Ltd., 875 F.2d 831, 834-35
(11 th Cir. 1989) (holding that attorney's filing of action was not subject to sanctions
under Rule 11 where it was reasonable to believe that facts supported claim); Davis v.
Crush, 862 F.2d 84, 89 (6th Cir. 1988) (concluding that there was room for reason-
able disagreement as to whether attorney conducted a reasonable inquiry into the
law); Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 861 F.2d 746, 759 (1st Cir. 1988) (hold-
ing plaintiff attorney's argument for equitable modification of the statute of limita-
tions may have had some merit); Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556 (11 th Cir.
1987) (holding whether pleading or motion is legally sufficient involves a question of
law subject to de novo review by court of appeals).
Thus, courts now determine whether or not the pre-filing investigation was ob-
jectively reasonable. The courts consider what a reasonable competent attorney or
party would have done under similar circumstances. Considerations include:
[H]ow much time for investigation was available to the signer; whether he
had to rely on a client for information as to the facts underlying the plead-
[Vol. 18
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three bases for imposing sanctions: an insufficient legal basis, an in-
sufficient factual basis, and an improper purpose. 2 1 Sanctions be-
came mandatory where the rule was violated,22 and judges were
given great latitude with respect to the types of sanctions available.23
Nevertheless, problems remained after the 1983 amendments to
Rule 11. First, courts applied Rule 11 inconsistently because of disa-
greement over the rule's underlying policy. 24 Second, pre-sanction
procedures were vaguely defined.25 Finally, critics believed that
Rule 11 was responsible for suppressing legitimate claims and crea-
tive advocacy.26
B. Minnesota Law
Prior to Uselman, the Minnesota Supreme Court had not addressed
the nature and scope of Rule 11.27 Moreover, Minnesota's lower
ing, motion or other paper; whether the pleading, motion, or other paper
was based on a plausible view of the law; or whether he depended on for-
warding counsel or another member of the bar.
FED R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes to 1983 amendment.
21. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also Alan E. Untereiner, A Uni-
form Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions, 97 YALE L.J. 901, 904 (1988).
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 ("If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in viola-
tion of this rule, the court ... shall impose.., an appropriate sanction . ) (empha-
sis added).
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes to 1983 amendment (stating
that the court "has discretion to tailor sanctions to the particular facts of the case");
see generally Untereiner, supra note 21, at 909 (discussing the need for a uniform ap-
proach to imposing and calculating individual sanctions so as to not discourage legit-,
imate lawsuits).
24. See infra notes 37 & 41 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
26. The potential of Rule 11 to deter legitimate claims has been widely recog-
nized. See, e.g., Uselman v. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d 130, 142 (Minn. 1990) ("[W]hile
some sanctionable conduct might under these circumstances escape discipline, that is
preferable to deterring legitimate or arguably legitimate claims."); see also FED. R.
Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes to 1983 amendment of Rule 11 ("The Rule is
not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or
legal theories."); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of N.Y., 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir.
1985) ("[W]e do not intend to stifle the enthusiasm or chill the creativity that is the
very lifeblood of the law."); Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 836 F.2d 1156,
1159-60 (9th Cir. 1987) ("An award of Rule 11 sanctions raises two competing con-
cerns: the desire to avoid abusive use of the judicial process and to avoid chilling
zealous advocacy."); Michael A. Mack, Rule 1)-Myth v. Reality, FOR THE DEFENSE,
Apr. 1991, at 6-7 (arguing that the "chilling effect" caused by Rule 11 sanctions is
unfounded).
27. See Uselman, 464 N.W.2d at 142 ("On this our first occasion to address the
nature and scope of the new Rule .... ).
Given the similarity between federal Rule I 1 and Minnesota's Rule 11 as well as
the lack of prior Minnesota cases on Rule 11, the Uselman court based much of its
1992]
5
Boos: Civil Procedure—Towards Consistent Application of Rule 11 Sanctio
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992
WILLIAM MITCHELL L W REVIEW
courts had examined Rule 11 matters infrequently.28 The Uselman
court, therefore, did not draw upon existing Minnesota law when de-
ciding the nature and scope of Rule 11.
The Uselman court looked instead to cases interpreting federal
Rule 11 as a basis for its holdings.29 The court used federal law be-
cause only "minor and insignificant differences" exist between Min-
nesota's Rule 11 and federal Rule 11 as amended in 1983.30 Thus,
the Uselman decision is based on nonbinding, federal authority.31
C. Policy Foundations of Rule 11
The policy underlying Rule 11 has been expressed as one or more
of the following: compensation, 32 punishment,33 and deterrence.3 4
decision on federal authority. Id. ("[C]ases interpreting the federal rule are valuable
guidelines in understanding [Rule 1 l's] purpose and application.").
Before Uselman, many Minnesota cases dealing with attorney misconduct could
be brought under section 549.21 of the Minnesota Statutes. However, section
549.21 dealt only with awards of attorney's fees and costs, not sanctions. "An award
under this section shall be ... an alternative to any claim for sanctions that may be
asserted under the rules of civil procedure." MINN. STAT. § 549.21 (1988).
28. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
29. Uselman v. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d 130, 142 (Minn. 1990) ("[Wlhile not bind-
ing on this court, cases interpreting the federal rule are valuable guidelines in under-
standing its purpose and application.").
The Uselman court did not discuss prior Minnesota case law on Rule 11. The
court treated the Rule 11 issue as an issue of first impression and relied on federal
cases interpreting the federal version of Rule 11. Nonetheless, a discussion of prior
Minnesota court decisions regarding Rule 11 issues prior to Uselman are relevant to
the issues presented in this Case Note.
In Mears Park Holding Corp. v. Morse/Diesel, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 214, 217 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988), the appellate court examined the issues of Rule 11 policy, due pro-
cess and appellate review standards. Id. at 217. The Mears court adopted the view of
the Fifth Circuit that abuse of discretion was the proper standard of review for Rule
11 matters. Id. at 218.
Next, the Mears court indicated that it regarded the policy foundations of Rule
11 as deterrence, punishment and compensation. Id. at 219. The Mears court stated,
"[w]hat constitutes 'reasonable expenses' and a 'reasonable attorney's fee' within the
context of Rule 11 must be considered in tandem with the rule's goals of deterrence,
punishment, and compensation." Id. (quoting Thomas v. Capital Security Servs.,
Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 869 (5th Cir. 1988)).
30. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d 130, at 142. There is a notable variation between the
Minnesota and the Federal Rule 11 advisory committee notes. The Minnesota ver-
sion mentions the policies underlying Rule 11 as compensation, punishment, and
deterrence. MINN. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes. The federal version, how-
ever, mentions only deterrence as the policy goal underlying Rule 11. FED. R. Civ. P.
11 advisory committee's notes to 1983 amendment.
31. See supra note 27.
32. Compensation is defined as: "[i]ndemnification; payment of damages; mak-
ing amends; making whole; giving an equivalent or substitute of equal value."
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 283 (6th ed. 1990).
33. Punishment is defined as: "[a]ny fine, penalty, or confinement inflicted upon
[Vol. 18
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Disagreement exists as to which policy should prevail in the applica-
tion of Rule 11.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was the
first circuit court to confront the issue of the underlying purpose of
Rule 11.35 In In re Yagman, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the "primary
purpose" of Rule 11 is to "deter subsequent abuses" in that litiga-
tion.36 A majority ofjudges and commentators also agree that deter-
rence is the primary purpose of the rule.3 7 However, the Seventh
Circuit in In re TCI Ltd. ,38 suggested that compensation is a major, if
not the primary, rationale for Rule 11 sanctions.3 9
Because courts disagree on the primary policy underlying Rule
11,40 they have applied the rule erratically.41 Unfortunately, the
a person by the authority of the law and the judgment and sentence of a court, for
some crime or offense committed by him, or for his omission of a duty enjoined by
law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1234 (6th ed. 1990).
34. A number of authorities distinguish between specific and general deterrence.
See generally Untereiner, supra note 20, at 908-09.
35. See In re Yagman 796 F.2d 1165, 1184 (9th Cir.), amended and reh 'g denied, 803
F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1987).
36. Id. at 1183. The court held that deterrence was the "paramount" and "over-
riding" goal of Rule 11. Id. at 1184.
37. "When asked about Rule lI's primary purpose, 59.4% of district court
judges answered deterrence, while 19.6% said punishment and 21 % compensation."
Untereiner, supra note 20, at 906 n.40.
For those favoring deterrence, see William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1020 n.31 (1988) (stating that most commentators seem to agree
that deterrence of abuse is the overriding purpose of Rule 11); see also FED. R. Civ. P.
11 advisory committee's notes to 1983 amendment of Rule 11 (mentioning only de-
terrence as Rule 11 's primary purpose); Untereiner, supra note 20, at 907 ("[ludges
should consider deterrence to be the primary goal of Rule 11.").
For an example of judges and commentators who argue that the rule's focus
should be either compensation or punishment, see Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of
N.Y., 637 F. Supp. 558, 564 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), modified and remanded, 821 F.2d 121 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S 918 (1987) (relying on compensation rationale); see also Neal
H. Klausner, Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11: Preventing Frivolous Litigation by Demanding
Professional Responsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 300, 331 n.228 (1986) (arguing that the
purpose of Rule 11 is primarily punitive). See generally Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions
Under Amended Federal Rule 11 -Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensa-
tion and Punishment, 74 GEO. LJ. 1313, 1323-25 [hereinafter Some "Chilling Problems']
(arguing that two divergent views regarding Rule lI's purpose are compensation and
punishment, both of which serve a deterrence function).
38. 769 F.2d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 1985).
39. Id.
40. See supra note 37.
41. See Untereiner, supra note 21, at 905-06 ("[N]onuniformity in sanctioning will
persist unless consensus is reached over the Rule's overarching purpose.").
Disagreement over Rule I l's primary purpose "accounts for wide disparities in
sanctioning practice." See id. at 907 n.43 (quoting NEW YORK BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF
THE COMM. ON FEDERAL COURTS: SANCTIONS AND ATTORNEY's FEES, 15 (1987)) ("Ex-
amination of the reported cases reveals a great deal of inconsistency as to whether
there has been a Rule 11 violation, and if so, what sanction should be imposed. Part
1992]
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wide disparities in sanctioning practices are likely to continue until
the primary purpose of Rule 11 is uniformly determined a2
D. Procedural Requirements Under Rule 11
The procedures required for the imposition of Rule 1 1 are un-
clear. Those facing sanctions are protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment,43 which ensures that those facing
sanctions are given notice of possible sanctions and opportunity to
respond.44 Nonetheless, "[n]o set rule can be stated to govern all
Rule 11 cases; the standard is necessarily flexible to cover varying
situations.'45
There are difficulties in trying to determine what procedures are
necessary under the Due Process Clause. First, the federal Rule 11
Advisory Committee stated that those facing sanctions should re-
ceive notice promptly upon discovering a basis for imposing sanc-
tions.46 However, some federal courts regard the existence of Rule
1 1 itself to be sufficient notice.47 Second, there is uncertainty as to
of the reason for this seems to be that the courts have not yet agreed upon the pur-
pose or purposes of Rule 11."); Vairo, supra note 10, at 203 (explaining that confu-
sion over Rule lI's primary purpose has led to inconsistent results in Rule 11 cases).
42. See supra note 41.
43. Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1558 (11 th Cir. 1987). For example,
where an attorney files a complaint with no basis in fact, the existence of the rule
itself may be sufficient notice. Id. at 1560. But see Tom Growney Equip., Inc., v.
Shelley Irrigation Dev., Inc., 834 F.2d 833, 836 n.5 (9th Cir. 1987)("[W]e distinguish
ourselves from other courts that have found the 'notice' requirement satisfied by the
mere presence of the rule.").
If, however, the issue is whether or not the attorney made a legally tenable argu-
ment, the court may require more specific notice as to possible sanctions. See Donald-
son, 819 F.2d 1551, at 1560. See generally Nancy Burger-Smith, Note, Avoiding Sanctions
Under Federal Rule 11: A Lawyer's Guide to the "New" Rule, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
607, 620 (1989) (discussing due process clause requirements when applying Rule 11
sanctions).
The Donaldson case explored in detail the process that was due on Rule 11 mo-
tions. It is, therefore, a helpful guide to the procedural guidelines for imposing Rule
11 sanctions. Furthermore, the Uselman court cited the Donaldson case with respect to
Rule 11 and procedural issues. See Uselman v. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d 130, 143
(Minn. 1990).
44. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980) (entitling an
attorney facing sanctions to a hearing on the record); Davis v. Crush, 862 F.2d 84,
88-89 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that a hearing may not always be necessary but may be
compelled if the case is dismissed without trial); Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d
81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987) (explaining that those facing sanctions should be given an op-
portunity to respond to the notice of possible Rule 11 sanctions).
45. Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1558.
46. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes to 1983 amendment ("A
party seeking sanctions should give notice to the court and the offending party
promptly upon discovering a basis for doing so.").
47. See supra note 43. Authorities also disagree as to whether the court or the
[Vol. 18
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whether the trial judge may determine the timing of imposition or
whether judges must impose sanctions at the time of the sanction-
able conduct.48
E. Post-Summary Judgment Sanctions
There is little authority regarding whether, under any circum-
stances, a party surviving summary judgment with its major claims
intact ought to be subject to Rule 1 1 sanctions after a trial predicated
on those claims. The existing authority suggests that to do so is gen-
erally unfair,49 although there are times when sanctioning frivolous
claims is appropriate despite the fact that the claims have survived
summary judgment motions.50
Commentators argue that a party surviving summaryjudgment has
no reason to believe that the court considers its claim or defense
frivolous.51 Furthermore, it has been argued that if a claim or de-
fense is indeed frivolous, that fact should be apparent early in the
litigation process. 52
party seeking sanctions should provide the notice. Compare Donaldson, 819 F.2d at
1560 (holding that notice can come from the party or the court) with FED. R. Civ. P.
11 advisory committee's notes to 1983 amendment (stating that a party, not necessar-
ily the court, should give notice).
48. The federal Rul 11 advisory committee intended that the judge have discre-
tion. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes to 1983 amendment. A
number of federal circuits, however, require that sanctions be imposed promptly at
the time of the offending conduct rather than after trial, in order to promote deter-
rence. Prompt sanctions are believed to deter subsequent abuses. See Thomas v.
Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 881 (5th Cir. 1988) ("A proper sanction as-
sessed at the time of a transgression will ordinarily have some measure of deterrent
effect on subsequent abuses and resultant sanctions."); Brown v. Fed'n of State Medi-
cal Bds. of United States, 830 F.2d 1429, 1438 (7th Cir. 1987) (recognizing deter-
rence goals).
49. See Melissa L. Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Looking for a
Middle Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 HASTINGs L.J. 383, 391 (1990) [hereinafter
Chancellor Shot Himself] (criticizing the award of sanctions for frivolity after a court has
denied summary judgment); see also Schwarzer, supra note 37, at 1019 n.27 ("[I]t
would be inequitable to permit a defendant to increase the amount of attorney's fees
recoverable as a sanction by unnecessarily defending against frivolous claims.") (cit-
ing Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
918 (1987)).
50. See supra note 49 and accompanying text; see also infra note 100 and accompa-
nying text.
51. See Chancellor Shot Himself, supra note 49, at 391.
52. See Schwarzer, supra note 37, at 1019. The author states:
If a claim or defense is indeed frivolous, that fact should be sufficiently ap-
parent, early in the litigation process, for the judge or opposing counsel to
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III. USELMAN V. USELMAN
A. Facts
In Uselman,53 the trial court judge imposed Rule 11 sanctions on
the plaintiff's attorney following a judgment in favor of the defend-
ants.5 4 The court imposed sanctions after finding that the plaintiff's
attorney had asserted frivolous and costly claims and thus had un-
necessarily increased the cost of litigation.55 The sanctions against
the plaintiff's attorney included an $83,500 fine in favor of defend-
ant Uselman and a $106,700 fine in favor of defendant Norwest.
56
Two different judges presided over the pre-trial and trial stages of
the suit.57 In July 1986, both defendants filed notices with the pre-
trial judge of their intent to claim fees and costs.5 8 These notices did
not contain any mention of Rule 11 sanctions.59 In February 1988,
defendants Uselman filed a motion for fees and sanctions pursuant
to section 549.21 of the Minnesota Statutes and Rule 11.60 In June
1988, after the trial, both defendants moved for Rule 11 sanctions as
well as fees and costs. 6' This motion was made at the invitation of
the trial court judge.62
The trial court judge awarded Rule 11 sanctions to both defend-
53. Uselman v. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d 130 (Minn. 1990). This suit was brought
by plaintiff Mary Ann Uselman against defendants Norwest Bank of Minneapolis and
Jerry and George Uselman. Plaintiff Uselman sought to obtain rescission of the sale
of stock held by her late husband which had been transferred on his death to the trust
administered by Norwest. Plaintiff claimed that defendant Norwest breached its fidu-
ciary duty and was negligent in selling stock for less than its fair market value. Id. at
134.
Plaintiff further claimed that defendants Uselman were liable for conversion of
corporate assets, misappropriation, breach of fiduciary duty and misrepresentation.
Plaintiffs sought disgorgement of monies wrongfully taken or, as an alternative, com-
pensatory damages as well as punitive damages. Id.
54. Id. at 136. See also infra note 63 for a description of the motions brought by
both parties' attorneys prior to the imposition of sanctions.
55. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d at 140.
56. Id. at 136.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 144. The defendants' notices of intent to claim fees and costs were
made pursuant to section 549.21 of the Minnesota Statutes, not Rule 11. See MINN.
STAT. § 549.21 (1988). Section 549.21 allows attorneys to recover costs and fees in-
curred while defending frivolous claims. Section 549.21 does not, however, provide
a basis for attorneys to recover sanctions beyond fees and costs. Rule 11 is the only
provision that allows such punitive sanctions to be imposed.
59. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d at 144.
60. Id.
61. Id.
Defendants Uselman made their motion for fees and other sanctions on Febru-
ary 26, 1988. Then, on June 3, 1988, defendant Norwest filed a broader motion for
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ants based on a motion brought by the plaintiff's attorney during the
pre-trial proceedings when a different judge presided.63 During the
pre-trial period, the plaintiff's attorney twice moved to amend the
complaint.64 The trial court judge awarded Rule 1 1 sanctions on the
grounds that the second motion to amend was frivolous.65 The trial
court judge imposed sanctions despite the fact that neither he nor
the pre-trial judge had warned plaintiff's counsel. 66 The judge, in
making his determination, identified deficiencies in the pleadings as
support for the imposition of sanctions.67 Moreover, the judge de-
nied a request by plaintiff's attorney for a hearing on the issue of
sanctions and for a continuance until the transcript of the trial was
completed.68
B. The Court's Holding and Reasoning
The Minnesota Supreme Court determined that deterrence is the
primary purpose of Rule 11.69 The court also held that the trial
court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions without providing
certain minimum procedural safeguards to the plaintiff's attorney.70
The supreme court premised these holdings on three factors.7T
63. Id. at 136. The motions brought by the parties included: plaintiff's two at-
tempts to amend their complaint to include the Uselman children as plaintiffs,
Norwest's motion for a stay, and numerous motions by defendants for dismissal or
summary judgment. Later, after the trial issues had been narrowed, defendants
moved to dismiss the Uselman children as plaintiffs. Finally, defendants' summary
judgment motions were denied on the grounds that genuine issues of material fact
still remained with respect to claims of misrepresentation, breaches of fiduciary duty,
failure to activate buy-sell agreements, and failure to seek outside purchases. Id.
After the trial judge was assigned, defendants unsuccessfully renewed their mo-
tion for summary judgment. Then, shortly before trial, defendants Uselman filed a
motion to deny the plaintiff's demand for ajury trial with regard to any claims against
them specifically. Norwest also filed its third motion for summary judgment and
sought to exclude any expert testimony. Id.
During trial, plaintiffs moved the trial court to recuse or declare a mistrial be-
cause of the attitudes and comments of the court. After the court returned a verdict
in favor of the defendants, plaintiffs moved for a new trial or in the alternative for
amended findings. Id.
64. Id. Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on April 3, 1984. Thereafter,
Plaintiff amended their complaint twice. The second amended complaint was filed
on April 6, 1987. Id. at 140 n.5.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 136, 144.
67. Id. at 144. These deficiencies are not detailed but presumably refer to the
trial judge's conclusion that the Uselman children were unnecessary parties.
68. Id. The court believed that no transcript was necessary. Id.
69. Id. at 142.
70. Id. at 141, 145.
71. Id. at 144. The supreme court based its decision on a fourth factor as well.
Namely, that the trial court was incorrect in criticizing plaintiffs attorney for advising
her clients to retain separate counsel. Id. It is difficult to predict how courts will
1992]
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First, the court held that the plaintiff's attorney did not receive
timely notice that Rule 11 sanctions were forthcoming. 72 The court
reasoned that such notice is designed to provide an opportunity to
correct future conduct, thereby advancing the policy of deterrence
rather than punishment. 73
Second, the court held that the pre-trial judge erred by failing to
impose sanctions at the time of abuse and by failing to rule on any
claimed violations that occurred while he presided. 74 Third, the
supreme court held that the trial court erred by failing to comply
with the sanctioned attorney's request to obtain and review the trial
transcript. 75 The court reasoned that such safeguards would "facili-
tate an orderly and uniform approach to the imposition of
sanctions." 76
Finally, the supreme court held that a party who survives summary
judgment with their major claims intact should not be subject to
Rule 1 1 sanctions predicated on those surviving claims. 77 The court
argued that to hold otherwise would encourage a "never say die"
attitude toward sanctions. The court also expressed concern over an
increase in the burden of satellite litigation resulting from the impo-
sition of such sanctions.78
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Policy Foundations
In Uselman, the Minnesota Supreme Court wisely narrowed the
policy objectives of Rule 11 by classifying the rule as a "mechanism
apply this fourth factor. For example, it is unknown whether the supreme court
would have censured the trial court for any criticism (even correct criticism).
72. Id. The court stated that defendants' references to sanctions in their briefs
and memoranda were insufficient notice to plaintiffs counsel. Id.
In a recent opinion written by Judge Davies of the Minnesota Court of Appeals,
the court interpreted and further defined the Uselman requirement of "fair notice"
Radloffv. First American Nat'l Bank, 470 N.W.2d 154 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). See also
infra note 89.
73. See Uselman, 464 N.W.2d at 143. The court stated:
A policy of deterrence "is not well served by tolerating abuses during the
course of an action and then punishing the offender after the trial is at an
end. A proper sanction assessed at the time of the transgression will ordina-
rily have some measure of deterrent effect on subsequent abuses and resul-
tant sanctions."
Id. (quoting In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1183, amended and reh 'g denied, 803 F.2d
1085 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1987)).
74. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d at 144.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 143 (citing Greenberg v. Hilton Int'l Co., 870 F.2d 926, 937, vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 875 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1989)).
77. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d at 144.
78. Id. at 144-45.
[Vol. 18
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for deterrence rather than a punitive or cost-shifting device."TO The
court adopted the views of both the Federal Rule 1 1 Advisory Com-
mittee ao and the majority of judges and commentators. 8 Conse-
quently, the court placed Minnesota courts on the path to a
uniform8 2 and orderly application of Rule 11 sanctions.83
B. Procedural Requirements
The Uselman court required that minimum procedural safeguards
precede any imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. Specifically, Uselman
required that an attorney or party have "fair notice of both the possi-
bility of a sanction and the reason for its proposed imposition."84 In
so holding, the Uselman court promoted the deterrence of frivolous
litigation, eliminated inconsistency in imposing sanctions, and lim-
ited Rule lI's inhibitive effects on legitimate claims.8 5
1. Timely Notice
While the Uselman court held that any imposition of Rule 11 sanc-
tions must be preceded by "timely notice," it did not precisely de-
fine its meaning. However, the court's holding suggests that "timely
notice" includes the requirement that notice of possible sanctions be
given at the time of abuse. The defendants in Uselman, during the
pre-trial proceedings, had given notice of an intent to seek fees and
costs pursuant to section 549.21 of the Minnesota Statutes.8 6 The
defendants did not, however, give notice of an intent to seek Rule 11
sanctions.8 7 Further, the court did not give notice that it was consider-
ing the imposition of sanctions until after judgment was entered in
1988.88 Thus, in holding that the notice in Uselman was insufficient
to sustain Rule 11 sanctions, the supreme court suggested that no-
tice of a possible sanction must be given at the time of abuse.
Time-of-abuse notice advances the policy of deterrence. Upon re-
ceiving notice, those facing sanctions will have an opportunity to cor-
79. Id. at 142. For cases and commentators favoring deterrence as the primary
policy of Rule 11, see supra note 37.
80. See FED. R. Civ. P. I 1 advisory committee's notes to 1983 amendment (men-
tioning only deterrence as Rule lI's policy goal).
81. See supra note 37 and accompanying text for discussion concerning the pri-
mary policy goals of Rule 11.
82. For a discussion of the problem of non-uniformity in sanctioning, see supra
part II-C.
83. One of the court's stated goals in Uselman was "[t]o facilitate an orderly and
uniform approach to the imposition of sanctions." Uselman, 464 N.W.2d at 143.
84. Id.
85. See supra part II-C.
86. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d at 144; see also supra part III-A.
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rect future conducts9 because they will promptly understand the type
of conduct which falls outside the scope of proper pleading. The
opportunity for correction would not be present if notice were re-
quired only at the end of the litigation process.
Subsequently, however, the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Radloff
v. First American National Bank,90 discussed the issue of whether Rule
11 notice must be explicit, or may be implied. The Radloff court
held that Uselman allowed implied notice, rather than explicit notice,
where numerous adverse orders and motions, prior to the imposi-
tion of sanctions, provided sufficient warning that sanctions may be
forthcoming.9l Radloff exploits a possibility raised by Uselman, that in
"very unusual circumstances" it could be "permissible for the trial
court to wait until the conclusion of the litigation to announce that
sanctions will be considered or imposed."9 2 Although the court did
not define those unusual circumstances, it suggested that implied no-
tice, or perhaps no notice, will suffice in some circumstances. It may
be said that Radloffspecifies one unusual circumstance where implied
notice is sufficient to impose Rule 11 sanctions: where the plaintiff
suffered countless adverse rulings on motions and orders denying
relief and had no claims remaining for trial.93 To this extent, Radloff
and Uselman may be reconciled with regard to the notice
requirement.94
89. Cf Vairo, supra note 10, at 194 ("[Tlhe power to strike pleadings early in the
litigation, pursuant to Rule 11, 12, 16 or 26, or to grant summary judgment under
Rule 56, will enable the court effectively to control unnecessary discovery.").
90. 470 N.W.2d 154 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
91. Id. The notice discussion in Radloffwas merely dictum. Id. at 159 ("Although
appellants did not precisely appeal the notice issue under Uselman, it should be ad-
dressed by this court.").
In Radloff, the trial court sanctioned plaintiff's attorney under Rule 11 without
explicit warning. Prior to the application of sanctions, eight of plaintiffs original
seventeen claims were voluntarily dismissed, the court had dismissed a claim, the
court had denied a motion to add a defendant, and summary judgment was ulti-
mately granted on the remaining claims. Id. at 155.
The Radloff and Uselman outcomes are reconcilable. Both cases involved numer-
ous adverse rulings in regard to the plaintiffs motions and orders. The plaintiffs in
Uselman, however, had several claims that survived and were later adjudicated. The
plaintiffs in Radloff had no claims survive to the trial stage. Id.
92. Id. at 157.
93. Id.
94. The discussion on the impact of Radloff assumes that the Radloff court re-
ferred to Rule 11 notice, rather than to section 549.21 notice. See MINN. STAT.
§ 549.21 (1986). The court stated that "[e]xplicit warning was not required in this
case, since unlike the pre-1986 version of Minn. Stat. § 549.21 relied upon by the
Uselman court, the statute does not contain the provision which specifically required
'timely notice of intent to claim an award.' " Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 549.21
(1986)).
The Radloff court mistakenly applied the statutory notice requirement to Rule
[Vol. 18
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The Uselman court also prudently held that sanctions must be im-
posed at the time of abuse, and by the judge then presiding. Again,
time-of-abuse sanctions will encourage the deterrence of frivolous
claims and result in less frivolous litigation.95 Moreover, in requir-
ing that the judge presiding at the time of sanctionable conduct im-
pose the sanctions, the Uselman court eliminates imprecise Rule 11
rulings. The holding is also consistent with time-of-abuse notice, as a
judge not sitting at the time of abuse would not have occasion to
notify a Rule 11 violator that sanctions may be forthcoming.
3. Opportunity to Respond
Finally, the Uselman court minimized the suppression of creative
advocacy by holding that those facing sanctions be allowed to re-
spond to notice of a possible Rule 11 sanction.9 6 Those facing sanc-
tions will now have an opportunity to review the transcript before the
sanction ruling.97 Without such an opportunity, attorneys would be
less inclined to litigate claims that had even a remote chance of being
viewed as frivolous. The fear of having no opportunity to respond or
no chance to review the transcript would "chill" the filing of such
borderline claims.98
C. Post-Summary Judgment Sanctions
The Uselman court held that claims surviving summary judgment
are not subject to Rule 11 sanctions following a trial predicated on
those claims.99 This holding limits the effectiveness of Rule 11. To
be sure, this writer recognizes that most claims surviving summary
judgment will not be subject to Rule 11 sanctions. The supreme
court's holding, however, is faulty to the extent that it absolutely insu-
lates from Rule 1 1 those claims surviving summary judgment.oo
11. Rule 11 has its own notice requirement as evidenced by the Uselman court's in-
dependent treatment of § 549.21 and Rule 11.
95. The Uselman court held that it was "incumbent upon the first pre-trial judge
to award sanctions at the time of the claimed abuse, and certainly, to rule itself on




98. Such claims are those claims that may be reasonably construed as either friv-
olous or legitimate. For example, a borderline claim would be one that seeks to
break new ground in a given area of law, but that is perhaps not warranted by ex-
isting law. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
99. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d at 144.
100. The drafters of Rule 11 contemplated that, in the case of pleadings, the sanc-
tions issue will often be determined at the end of litigation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11
advisory committee notes to 1983 amendment. For cases involving sanctions against
1992]
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Frivolous claims may survive a motion for summary judgment. For
example, after a claim survives summary judgment, factual circum-
stances or the law may change, thus rendering the repeated assertion
of the claim untenable.0 Under Uselman, however, these frivolous
claims are insulated from Rule 11 and may therefore be endlessly
litigated.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
pointed out that "a determination of whether or not a pleading is
well grounded in law and fact may not be feasible until after an evi-
dentiary hearing on a motion for summary judgment or even after the
parties have presented their case at trial. " to2 Thus, judges may inadver-
parties previously surviving summary judgment, see Jennings v. Joshua Indep. Sch.
Dist., 869 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1989) (upholding award of sanctions after claim sur-
vived summary judgment because attorney failed to make reasonable inquiry of mini-
mal facts); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
918 (1987) (refusing to uphold sanctions imposed after summary judgment where
sufficient factual basis existed to bring malicious prosecution claim); Steinberg v. St.
Regis/Sheraton Hotel, 583 F. Supp. 421, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (upholding sanctions
imposed after summary judgment where no factual basis existed).
101. The Uselman court cited Greenberg v. Hilton Int'l Co., 870 F.2d 926, vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 875 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1989), to support the proposition
that a party surviving a summary judgment motion with its major claims intact should
not be subject to sanctions following a trial predicated on the surviving claims.
Uselman, 464 N.W.2d at 144. The Greenberg decision, however, did not stand for the
proposition that claims surviving summary judgment are insulated from Rule 11.
The Second Circuit recognized that frivolous claims may be endlessly litigated if a
claim surviving summary judgment is insulated from Rule 11. Greenberg, 870 F.2d at
937. Accordingly, the Greenberg court suggested that sanctions were possible after the
claim survived summary judgment.
The Greenberg case involved a Title VII claim brought by an employee against his
former employer. The claim survived summary judgment. Subsequently, however,
the law changed, rendering the claim frivolous. The point made by the Greenberg
court was that the employee could not be sanctioned given her information at the
time of the summary judgment. Id. The Greenberg court did not imply that, under all
circumstances, claims surviving summary judgment would be insulated from Rule 11
sanctions. This, however, is what the Uselman court inaccurately implies.
The language in Greenberg explicitly provides that there are situations where a
party could be sanctioned for claims that earlier survived summary judgment. The
court stated:
A [plaintiff] may not be sanctioned under Rule 11 .. so long as: (i) the
defeat of the [summary judgment] motion was not obtained by misleading
the court; (ii) the adversary has not attempted through some means on the
record to obtain withdrawal of that claim based on a change or clarification
of existing law; and (iii) the claim has not been repeated in papers filed after
the change or clarification of law.
Greenberg, 870 F.2d at 937. Thus, sanctions would be warranted if the either plaintiff
misled the court or, following the change in the law, the party opposing the claim had
unsuccessfully attempted to get the claim dismissed while the plaintiff repeatedly as-
serted it.
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tently deny a motion for summary judgment.103 Judges may be un-
sure whether, at the time the summary judgment motion is brought,
a claim is frivolous. Moreover, judges may deny summary judgment
believing that more discovery is necessary. These types of rulings
should not insulate claims from Rule 11.
Parties surviving summary judgment may claim reliance on the
judge's ruling. They may argue that the ruling caused them to disbe-
lieve that there was any reason that their claim was frivolous. If,
however, the claim that survived summary judgment (for example,
due to want of discovery or judicial indifference) turns out frivolous,
the sanctionable conduct should not be insulated from Rule 11. If it
were, Rule 11 would, in effect, tie the court's hands from the time of
summary judgment denial. In this way the Uselman decision imposes
a deadline after which the party bringing the claim is insulated from
Rule 11 regardless of whether the party's conduct merits sanctions.
To an extent, the court's holding encourages parties to overcome
summary judgment motions rather than deterring them from sanc-
tionable conduct. The purpose of Rule 11, however, is not to limit
judicial action but rather to govern attorney conduct.104 Thus, attor-
neys who are deserving of'Rule 11 sanctions should be sanctioned
regardless of the summary judgment rulings.
V. CONCLUSION
Uselman v. Uselman is significant because it provides guidelines for
future sanctions by establishing that deterrence is the primary policy
underlying Rule 11. 15 These guidelines will facilitate a uniform
procedural approach to the imposition of sanctions. After Uselman,
those facing Rule 1 1 sanctions in Minnesota can rely on the follow-
ing: timely notice of possible sanctions, an opportunity to respond to
that notice, a prompt ruling on a motion for sanctions, and the assur-
ance that Rule 11 sanctions will be imposed only by the judge presid-
ing at the time of the offending conduct. 106
This Case Note is critical, however, of the supreme court's deci-
sion to insulate parties who survive summary judgment from sanc-
tions following a trial on those surviving claims. The rigid holding
103. See Schwarzer, supra note 37, at 1019 (acknowledging that, despite the nu-
merous mechanisms for dismissing claims, including Federal Rules 12, 16, and 56,
judicial indifference may be responsible for incorrect summary judgment rulings).
104. See supra part IV-A.
105. See supra part II-C for discussion of controversy regarding the underlying pol-
icy of Rule 11.
106. See Uselman v. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d 130, 144-45 (Minn. 1990) (holding that
unless these guidelines are followed, it will be an abuse of discretion for a Minnesota
trial court to impose Rule 11 sanctions); see also supra note 5 and accompanying text
(discussing the abuse of discretion standard used in Rule 11 matters).
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allows frivolous claims that survive summary judgment to be end-
lessly litigated regardless of knowledge that a particular factual or
legal position is no longer tenable.
Matthew T. Boos
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